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INTRODUCTION
On March 22, 2021, Federal Reserve (“the Fed”) Chairman Jerome
Powell addressed the possibility of a United States (“U.S.”) central bank
digital currency (“CBDC”), or a “digital dollar,” stating that though the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(“MIT”) have partnered to explore its necessity and practicality, the Fed is
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“taking its time” before beginning its development.1 However, the
disbursement of stimulus checks during the COVID-19 pandemic, through
means including paper checks and prepaid debit cards, has catalyzed
conversations about the need for a utilization of the technology available and
able to provide streamlined, efficient and “immediate” solutions.2 The
conversation surrounding a digital dollar, then, has become a question of
“when,” not “if.”3 This paper observes the significance of privacy in the
greater digital currency space, and argues that, in this period of careful
exploration that will inform the future architecture and regulation of a U.S.
CBDC, a prioritization of privacy should be at the forefront of the
conversation surrounding the digital dollar.
First, Section One will provide an explanation of CBDCs. Section Two
will address the relevant discourse surrounding CBDCs and regulation
surrounding digital currency at large within the U.S., and Section Three will
then briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a CBDC. Section
Four of this paper will then provide the greater context of digital currencies
and their usage and implementations around the world, and examine the
factors that led to either the successes or failures of CBDCs in order to inform
this discussion of what an American implementation would look like.
Section Five considers the relationship between privacy and the law in the
U.S., as well as its history, to further provide the context for a thoughtful
consideration of a digital dollar. Assuming that, at some point in the future,
the Fed will decide that the advantages do outweigh the disadvantages and
decide to implement a CBDC, Section Six addresses the architectural means
to achieve a privacy-conscious digital dollar, while Section Seven provides
two recommendations to achieve the type of privacy-conscious regulatory
scheme that should govern the digital dollar.
The importance of preserving privacy, to the extent reasonably possible,
is at the heart of this paper. It is this paper’s primary position that, in order
to address the increase of governmental power that a CBDC may cause given
the exposure to personal information that may result from its widespread
usage, U.S. legislation must adapt to balance this power with the potential
privacy risks to American citizens by incorporating privacy not just in the
design of the digital dollar itself, but in the development of the regulatory
scheme surrounding it, by (1) destigmatizing digital currency and (2)
allowing for a reasonable amount of anonymity. The final section will then
conclude this discussion.

1. Jeff Cox, Powell Calls Cryptocurrencies ‘Not Really Useful Stores of Value’ and Says Fed Will
Move Slowly, CNBC (Mar. 22, 2021, 11:02 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/22/cryptocurrenciesare-not-useful-stores-of-value-says-feds-powell.html.
2. Experts Tell Congress it’s Time to Create a “Digital Dollar,” PYMNTS,
https://www.pymnts.com/digital-payments/2020/experts-tell-congress-create-digital-dollar (June 12,
2020).
3. Id.
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SECTION I: WHAT IS A CBDC?
Since its founding, the U.S. has been notably isolationist with respect
to its currency.4 The rise of cryptocurrency has sparked governmental
interest in possibly creating its own digital dollar. Instead of waiting and
watching the future of finance pass it by, the U.S. is responding with a high
level of engagement. While this engagement has been largely discussionbased thus far, there is vast potential for governmental incorporation of
digital currencies, plausibly through a CBDC.
CBDCs are government-issued digital assets, which have the ability to
expedite and increase the security of payments between banks,
institutions, and individuals.5 A CBDC is backed by a government’s own
central bank, and is legal tender that represents a claim against the central
bank, as opposed to a commercial bank or a payment service provider. It
has been considered a response to the rise, popularity, and notoriety of
decentralized digital currencies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.6 According
to a recent study conducted by the Bank for International Settlements
(“BIS”), more than 70% of institutions are actively researching and
developing proofs of concept for CBDCs.7 As CBDCs are still relatively new
and early in their development, most countries are starting to explore the
idea, including the U.S. Others have already developed their own CBDC
demos and are piloting them nationally.8
Many already-developed CBDCs are built on blockchain technology.
Blockchain technology is a system of recording information; it is a digital
ledger of transactions that is duplicated across a distributed network of
computer systems, and therefore is not controlled by a single entity.9 The
defining characteristics of the technology, including the lack of
intermediaries, result in blockchain finance being far more secure than cash,
credit, and other conventional forms of payment.10 This level of security has

4. Kimberly Amadeo, Why the US Dollar is the Global Currency, THE BALANCE (July 23, 2020),
https://www.thebalance.com/world-currency-3305931.
5. Matthieu Bouchaud ET AL., Central Banks and the Future of Digital Money, CONSENSYS (Jan.
2020), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4795067/ConsenSys-CBDC-White-Paper.pdf.
6. Tom Wilson, Explainer: Bitcoin’s Mainstream Charge Raises Stakes for Central Bank Digital
Cash,
REUTERS
(Feb.
15,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cenbanks-digitalexplainer/explainer-bitcoins-mainstream-charge-raises-stakes-for-central-bank-digital-cashidUSKBN2AF1BW.
7. Blockchain Solutions for Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), CONSENSYS,
https://consensys.net/solutions/payments-and-money/cbdc/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2021); Dante Disparte,
Could Digital Currencies Make Being Poor Less Costly?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/08/could-digital-currencies-make-being-poor-less-costly.
8. Jonathan Cheng, China Rolls Out Pilot Test of Digital Currency, THE WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-rolls-out-pilot-test-of-digital-currency-11587385339 (Apr. 20, 2020,
8:22 AM).
9. Emily Rutland, Blockchain Byte: R3 Research, R3 Research, FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH.,
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2017_BC_Byte.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
10. Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain.
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fast-tracked blockchain to the forefront of discussions concerning the future
financial infrastructure of the U.S. While there is a distinction to be made
between wholesale and retail CBDCs, this paper will focus on a retail CBDC,
one that would be used by consumers on a day-to-day basis.11

SECTION II: DIGITAL CURRENCY AND U.S. LAW
As a CBDC does not currently exist in the U.S., the regulatory
framework that would surround it has not yet been developed. Chairman
Powell said in his March 2021 statements that at least some “enabling
legislation” would need to be enacted before the Fed can proceed with the
digital dollar; thus, this currently underdeveloped area of the law is likely to
be built from the ground up in the coming years.12 Due to the lack of CBDC
regulation, and though a CBDC would not constitute a cryptocurrency,13 a
look at the cryptocurrency regulations currently in place will provide the
context of the relationship between digital currencies and the law that will
be useful in considering a digital dollar.
Executive and administrative agencies, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”)14, the Commodities and Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”), the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the
Department of the Treasury via the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), and the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), have been engaged with
cryptocurrency regulation, but little formal rulemaking has actually

11. Retail CBDCs: The Next Payments Frontier, OFFICIAL MONETARY AND FIN. INST. F. & INT’L
BUS. MACHINES CORP., https://www.omfif.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Retail-CBDCs-The-nextpayments-frontier.pdf (2019); Wouter Bossu et al., Legal Aspects of Central Bank Digital Currency:
Central Bank and Monetary Law Considerations (International Money Fund Working Papers, Paper No.
254, 2020), https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2020/English/wpiea2020254-printpdf.ashx.
12. Cox, supra note 1.
13. Alyssa Hertig, What is a CBDC?, COINDESK (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/whatis-a-cbdc; see also Diego Geroni, Crypto vs CBDC: Difference Between Blockchain-Enabled CBDC and
Other Crypto, 101 BLOCKCHAINS (Feb. 1, 2021), https://101blockchains.com/crypto-vs-cbdc.
14. The SEC generally has regulatory authority over the issuance and resale of any token or other
digital asset that constitutes a security. There is debate over whether the digital assets associated with
cryptocurrencies ought to constitute a “security” for SEC registration purposes; the regulatory treatment
of any particular crypto-asset depends greatly on whether or not it is a security. Former SEC Chairman
Jay Clayton said in June 2018 that cryptocurrencies “like Bitcoin” do not constitute securities, and as a
digital dollar would similarly aim to at least partially replace the U.S. dollar, it is likely that the direct
regulation of the digital dollar itself would not be under the SEC’s purview. Jay Clayton, Chairman,
Chairman’s Testimony on Virtual Currencies: The Roles of the SEC and CFTC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-virtual-currencies-oversightrole-us-securities-and-exchange-commission; see also Kate Rooney, SEC Chief Says Agency Won’t
Change Securities Laws to Cater to Cryptocurrencies, CNBC (June 8, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/sec-chairman-clayton-says-agency-wont-change-definition-of-asecurity.html.
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occurred.15 This is likely, at least partially, due to agency fears regarding both
overregulation and legislation that would result in foreign investment.16 That
is, if the U.S. overregulates or passes legislation that makes investment in
cryptocurrency unfavorable domestically, investors may resort to investing
in cryptocurrency and other uses of blockchain finance technology overseas,
which would not be consistent with the U.S. maintaining a leading role in
the development of this technology. However, this concern should not
continue to stall the creation of sufficient, effective, and informed
regulations. The need for these agencies to provide for public protection
alongside the rise of cryptocurrencies is only increasing, as the FTC recently
warned that cryptocurrency scammers are, increasingly often, tricking
people into sending them money.17 This further goes to the underdeveloped
nature of not just the framework that would one day regulate a CBDC, but
of the regulatory framework currently in place to address digital currencies
on the whole.
The federal government has taken an inhospitable approach to
cryptocurrency regulation. Former Attorney General William Barr in
October 2020 announced the creation of the Cryptocurrency Enforcement
Network, in what was widely regarded as an effort to undercut the ability of
cryptocurrency users to transact anonymously.18 The framework states that
the use of private coins themselves can be “indicative of possible criminal
conduct,” and targets decentralized exchanges specifically, which allow the
exchange of cryptocurrency between individuals without a third-party
mediator.19 The DOJ mandated registration with FinCEN and required
cryptocurrency exchanges to “collect and maintain customer and
transactional data,” or else be subject to civil and criminal penalties.20

15. Joe Dewey, Blockchain & Cryptocurrency Regulation 2021, GLOB. LEGAL INSIGHTS,
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/usa (last visited
Mar. 30, 2021).
16. Id.
17. In her upcoming article, “How to Regulate Blockchain’s Real Life Applications: Lessons from
the California Blockchain Working Group,” Professor Michele Benedetto Neitz addresses the importance
of creating blockchain technology laws that would protect the public from harm, as part of her greater
discussion surrounding the complex questions legislators must consider in regulating a brand-new
technology that they might not yet fully understand. Cryptocurrencies are an attractive, exciting
investment opportunity to many members of the public who may not be adequately informed to navigate
them responsibly; for example, one study found that about 78% of initial coin offerings (ICOs) in 2017
alone were actually scams. The author would like to thank Professor Neitz for her comments on and
supervision of this paper. Michele Benedetto Neitz, How to Regulate Blockchain’s Real-Life
Applications: Lessons from the California Blockchain Working Group, 61 JURIMETRICS (2021); see also
Cristina Miranda, Avoiding a Cryptocurrency Scam, FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER INFO., BLOG (July
16, 2020), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2020/07/avoiding-cryptocurrency-scam.
18. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General William P. Barr Announces Publication
of Cryptocurrency Enforcement Framework (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorneygeneral-william-p-barr-announces-publication-cryptocurrency-enforcement-framework.
19. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 20-1069, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK
FORCE: CRYPTOCURRENCY ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK at 23 (Oct. 8, 2020).
20. Id. at 38.

154

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18:1

In June 2020, the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Gratkowski that
law enforcement does not need a warrant in order to obtain financial
transaction data from cryptocurrency exchanges, and that the defendant did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records of his
cryptocurrency transactions.21 Finally, in December 2020, FinCEN and the
U.S. Treasury announced a bill that would require money service businesses,
including cryptocurrency exchanges, to collect identifying data about
individuals who transact with their customers using self-hosted
cryptocurrency wallets or foreign exchanges.22
At the state level, some states have intervened with their own
understandings of how cryptocurrencies and the law should interact. State
legislation has generally fallen into two categories – one which promotes
cryptocurrencies as part of larger efforts to stimulate local economies, and
another which limits or even prohibits cryptocurrencies out of fear of
volatility. For example, in Colorado, the legislature passed a bipartisan bill
which exempts cryptocurrencies from securities regulations, which could
encourage the use of cryptocurrency.23 In Wyoming, a state which has
demonstrably embraced cryptocurrency, the legislature passed a bill which
allows for the creation of a new type of bank, such that businesses will be
able to hold digital assets safely and legally.24 Ohio was the first state to
accept taxes via cryptocurrency, though it has since suspended this tax

21. United States v. Gratkowski, No. 19-50492 (5th Cir. June 30, 2020), (USCourts.gov, 5th Cir.
Opinions), https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/19/19-50492-CR0.pdf.
22. These proposals were viewed as widely controversial; critics said that it would be “technically
impossible” for some projects to comply as certain decentralized uses of this technology, such as smart
contracts, do not have or collect the information to provide. FinCEN received thousands of comments on
the proposal and extended the comment period by 45 days, and announced on January 14, 2021 that it
had already reviewed over 7,000 comments submitted during the original comment period. Nikhilesh De
& Kevin Reynolds, FinCEN Extends Comment Period for Controversial Crypto Wallet Rule, COINDESK
(Jan. 14, 2021, 6:03 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/fincen-extends-comment-period-for-controversialcrypto-wallet-rule-by-15-days; see also FinCEN Extends Comment Period for Rule Aimed at Closing
Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Gaps for Certain Convertible Virtual Currency and Digital Asset
Transactions, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.fincen.gov/news/newsreleases/fincen-extends-comment-period-rule-aimed-closing-anti-money-laundering; Lewis Zirogiannis
et al., FinCEN Announces Proposed Rule Aimed at Closing Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Gaps for
Certain Convertible Virtual Currency and Digital Asset Transactions, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Dec. 21,
2020),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/12/closing-anti-money-launderingregulatory-gaps; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
Proposes Rule Aimed at Closing Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Gaps for Certain Convertible
Virtual Currency and Digital Asset Transactions (Dec. 18, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/sm1216.
23. Senate
Bill
19-023,
Colorado
General
Assembly
(2019),
https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/2019a_023_signed.pdf.
24. Justin S. Wales & Mattew E. Kohen, State Regulations on Virtual Currency and Blockchain
Technologies
(Updated
July
2020),
CARLTON
FIELDS
(Oct.
17,
2017),
https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2020/state-regulations-on-virtual-currency-andblockchain-technologies-(updated-july-2020).
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payment program, citing “legal issues.”25 Perhaps most relevant to a future
CBDC, Oklahoma governmental agencies have begun accepting
cryptocurrency as an instrument of monetary value.26 On the other end of the
spectrum, Iowa introduced a bill that, if passed, would bar the state and
political subdivisions within from accepting cryptocurrency as a form of
payment.27 At least ten other states have issued formal warnings about the
dangers associated with cryptocurrency.28 This polarity in state intervention
can be read in two ways: states simply view cryptocurrency through different
lenses, by virtue of what it is and what they want their economies to reflect;
or, this polarity is a mere result of the lack of a centralized cryptocurrency,
and the real point of contention amongst state governments is whether it is
their place to regulate currencies independent from the U.S. dollar. Further,
there is reason to believe that an interjurisdictional race could take place
among the states: states with more cryptocurrency-friendly legislation, such
as Wyoming and Oklahoma, are more likely to attract the innovators of this
space and their new, possibly revolutionary products and services, than other
states.29
In terms of wholesale electronic funds transfers, the primary source of
regulation in the U.S. is Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”), which has been enacted in all 50 states.30 Article 4A addresses and
allocates the rights, obligations, and liabilities of banks, other intermediaries,
and their customers in the context of funds transfers.31 Its regulatory
framework for wholesale wire transfers has been influential, even
internationally.32 Though this regulation was designed for wholesale wire
transfers, Article 4A may be extended to regulate electronic funds transfers
in the context of a CBDC.33
Thus, due to the lack of a cohesive regulatory framework, there are
many unanswered questions with respect to the future of digital currencies.
The analysis below will focus on the question of, if the U.S. government
were to adopt a CBDC on a national scale, what the regulatory scheme would
need to look like in order to balance the government’s increase in access to
private information with the privacy concerns of American citizens.
25. Kelly P. Erb, Citing Legal Issues, Ohio Suspends Crypto Tax Payment Program, FORBES (Nov.
6, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2019/11/06/citing-legal-issues-ohio-suspendscrypto-tax-payment-program/.
26. Dewey, supra note 15.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. The idea of an interjurisdictional competition among states, and that “states who can win the
race to attract blockchain businesses to incorporate and domicile in their state can earn more than just
increased tax revenues from start-up companies,” is also explored by Neitz in her blockchain law article.
Neitz, supra note 17.
30. Steven L. Schwarcz, Central Bank Digital Currencies and Law, ISTITUTO AFFARI
INTERNAZIONALI (Sept. 4, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3684814.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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This paper will infer, based on the progress of other countries in this
space, as well as current regulations surrounding digital currency at large,
what may or may not be possible and preferable for the U.S. In order for the
U.S. to successfully utilize a CBDC and take advantage of the benefits that
it could promote, it must find a way to strike this balance.

SECTION III: THE PROS AND CONS OF A DIGITAL DOLLAR
The emergence of digital dollar has become a question of “when,” not
“if.”34 Weighing the advantages of adopting a CBDC against its potentially
less favorable consequences is important for two reasons. First, in order to
understand why it is likely that the pros will ultimately be deemed to
outweigh the cons; and second, in order to understand how the same access
to information that underlies some of the advantages may also give rise to
invasions of privacy.
To begin with the advantages, currently, the cost of managing and
transferring cash is high, and utilizing financial technology could
significantly reduce expenses and increase efficiency.35 ConsenSys, a
market-leading blockchain technology company, cites several conceivable
benefits for central banks and the wider financial system, including fostering
the digital assets revolution by sparking innovation and presenting private
companies with the opportunity to create products and services that respond
to the novel effects of a CBDC.36 A CBDC would also support cheaper crossborder remittances, and improve settlements of interbank payments.37
Further, central banks would have new tools for expanding and
reducing the supply of money, and improving the employment of initiatives,
such as direct distribution of money to individuals (as opposed to the indirect
methods typically used by governments today, such as tax breaks).38 The
Fed’s toolkit to carry out its dual mandate of promoting both low
unemployment and low inflation could be incredibly bolstered. In the words
of Ethereum co-founder Joseph Lubin, “CBDCs give central banks futureoriented tools to allow them to implement monetary policy in more direct,
innovative ways and keep pace with technological change.”39
Finally, a CBDC could help the U.S. accommodate currently unbanked
persons.40 Currently, 5.4 percent of U.S. households (approximately 7.1
34. PYMNTS, supra note 2.
35. The Rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/the-rise-of-central-bank-digital-currencies/.
36. Bouchaud et al., supra note 5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Blockchain Solutions for Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), CONSENSYS,
https://consensys.net/solutions/payments-and-money/cbdc/, (last visited Mar. 29, 2021).
40. Disparte, supra note 7; Central Bank Digital Currency Can Contribute to Financial Inclusion
but
Cannot
Solve
its
Root
Causes,
ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
(June
10,
2020),
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/geotech-cues/central-bank-digital-currency-can-contribute-tofinancial-inclusion-but-cannot-solve-its-root-causes.
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million households) are unbanked, and there is reason to believe that this is
highly associated with the hurdles that accompany opening a bank account.41
Because a CBDC, in theory, eliminates the need for a third-party bank
account, it would promote financial and social inclusion.
These advantages are not without their risks. For the purposes of this
paper, the potential invasions of privacy constitute the main drawback of a
CBDC that must be addressed in order for it to be successfully implemented.
A CBDC would likely provide central governments with ample insight into
the personal financial data and transaction details of private citizens.42
Currently, very few central banks have the appropriate legal frameworks in
place to support the launch of a CBDC; this is in part due to the other legal
questions a CBDC would raise, including whether or not CBDCs can be
considered a currency, and other technical questions about their design.43 A
study found that 69% of central banks cannot issue a tokenized version of a
CBDC due to their current legal framework.44 However, this paper assumes
that the necessary legal framework in the U.S. would precede the launch a
CBDC. That framework would not only need to be created to allow for the
launch of a CBDC, but would also need to be developed in order to address
the many other legal questions that it would pose. For the purposes of this
paper, the regulatory framework’s future relationship with privacy will be
assessed, and the analysis in later sections of the paper will focus on that
particular aspect of a digital dollar.

SECTION IV: INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO CBDCS
On August 13, 2020, Governor Lael Brainard announced that the Fed,
“like other central banks, [is] continuing to assess the opportunities and
challenges of, as well as the use cases for, a digital currency, as a complement
to cash and other payments options.”45 She also announced a partnership
between the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and MIT to explore the concept
of a CBDC and learn what architectural features a future digital dollar would
possess.46 Meanwhile, other countries continue to take the lead on piloting
CBDCs.
41. Mark Kutzbach et al., How America Banks: Household Use of Banking and Financial Services,
FED.
DEPOSIT
INSURANCE
CORP.,
https://www.economicinclusion.gov/downloads/2019_FDIC_Unbanked_HH_Survey_ExecSumm.pdf
(last visited Mar. 24, 2021).
42. Jess Cheng et al., Preconditions for a General-Purpose Central Bank Digital Currency, BD. OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RESERVE
SYS.
(Feb.
24,
2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/preconditions-for-a-general-purpose-centralbank-digital-currency-20210224.htm.
43. Rachael King, Podcast: The Legal Implications of CBDC, CENT. BANKING (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.centralbanking.com/fintech/cbdc/7797661/podcast-the-legal-implications-of-cbdc.
44. Id.
45. Lael Brainard, Governor, An Update on Digital Currencies, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE
SYS.,
(Aug.
13,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20200813a.htm.
46. Id.
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Perhaps most notably, China is at the forefront of CBDC development
and implementation. As the world’s second largest economy, China’s move
to digitize its currency has been momentous. It began with piloting its
CBDC, Digital Currency/Electronic Payment (“DCEP”), in different cities.47
Currently, there is no existing law in China that directly regulates DCEP.48
In October 2020, China’s deputy governor Fan YiFei announced that China’s
CBDC had been used in over 3.1 million transactions, with a valuation of
roughly 1.1 billion yuan ($162 million).49 While China did attempt to utilize
distributed ledger technology in CBDC prototypes, it ultimately found this
technology unsuitable for its digital currency50
Concerns about China’s employment of the DCEP to strengthen its
digital authoritarianism and export its influence abroad have begun to
surface.51 DCEP utilizes “controllable anonymity,” which means that while
both parties of a transaction may be anonymous to the public, the Chinese
government can still track all trading information.52 The Center for New
American Security (“CNAS”) found evidence in a 2018 PowerPoint
presentation, presumptively from the Chinese government, that its “central
bank digital currency [was] being designed to allow for surveillance of all
financial transactions throughout its society.”53 “By eliminating some of the
previous constraints on government data collection of private citizens’
transactions, DCEP represents a significant risk to the long-held standards of
financial privacy upheld in free societies,” states the CNAS report.54 CNAS
went on to emphasize that China is heading toward an obtainment of data
that “no other government has ever been able to efficiently assemble,” due
to the immediate authentication of each transaction.55 Yaya J. Fanusie, a coauthor of the CNAS report, said in an email to CoinDesk that “DCEP would
give the Chinese Communist Party something that no government has ever
had in history: the ability to monitor in real time the minute financial dealings

47. Yaya J. Fanusie & Emily Jin, China’s Digital Currency: Adding Financial Data to Digital
Authoritarianism,
CNAS
(Jan.
2021),
https://s3.us-east1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report-Chinas-Digital-Currency-Jan-2021final.pdf.
48. Betty Louie & Martha Wang, China’s Digital Currency and What This Could Mean For Foreign
Companies and Financial Institutions in China, JD SUPRA (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-s-digital-currency-and-what-this-7987963/ .
49. Ada Hui, China Central Bank Official Reveals Results of First Digital Yuan Pilots, COINDESK
(Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/china-central-bank-official-reveals-results-of-first-digitalyuan-pilots.
50. Fanusie & Jin, supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.; see also Jason Brett, China’s Digital Yuan Reported to be Ultimate Financial Censorship
Tool, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2021/01/27/chinas-digital-yuanreported-to-be-ultimate-financial-censorship-tool/?sh=3707718c50ac.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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of its citizens.”56 He clarified that while much of the world transacts digitally
today, that transactional data “is not accessible wholesale by government
authorities because the government has to go through financial institutions
to acquire the data.”57 In contrast, the DCEP puts the data directly in the
hands of the Chinese government, without requiring it to go through
intermediaries; as would any CBDC with any central bank issuing it.58
Accordingly, individuals using a digital yuan are inevitably conceding much
of their financial privacy, and this would not be unique to the DCEP.59
Thus, privacy concerns are arising in light of the massive “amount of
insight a CBDC would give Chinese authorities into its users’ financial data
and behavior,” as well as information about anyone who interacts with those
users, including international citizens.60 While Chinese officials have
indicated that the large amounts of DCEP data will be used only to enhance
monetary policy and monitor illegal activity, other, more senior officials
have stated that DCEP may even be used as a tool to enforce political
agendas.61
Meanwhile, in May 2020, Yves Mersch, Vice-Chair of the Supervisory
Board and Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank
(“ECB”), acknowledged the importance and significance of preserving
privacy, suggesting that an attempt to reduce the privacy of payments would
“inevitably raise social, political and legal issues.”62 In an October 2020 ECB
report, Fabio Panetta, ECB Executive Board Member and Chair of the
Eurosystem High-Level Task Force on Central Bank Digital Currency,
announced that:
“to ensure that consumers continue to have unfettered access to central
bank money in a way that meets their needs in the digital age, the ECB’s
Governing Council decided to advance work on the possible issuance of a
digital euro – an electronic form of central bank money accessible to all
citizens and firms. A digital euro would be introduced alongside cash, it
would not replace it.”63

56. Benjamin Powers, Geopolitics at Stake in US Response to China’s Digital Yuan: Report,
COINDESK (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.coindesk.com/us-china-digital-yuan-cbdc-geopolitical-powerreport.
57. Id.
58. Powers, supra note 56.
59. Powers, supra note 56.
60. Tanzeel Akhtar, China Proposes Global Rules for Monitoring CBDCs, COINDESK (Mar. 25,
2021), https://www.coindesk.com/china-proposes-global-rules-for-monitoring-cbdcs; see also Powers,
supra note 52.
61. Fanusie & Jin, supra note 47.
62. Nikhilesh De, ‘Game-Changer’ Retail Digital Currency Now European Central Bank’s Focus,
Board Member Says, COINDESK (May 11, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/cbdc-ecb-yves-merscheuro.
63. Report
on
a
Digital
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EUROPEAN
CENT.
BANK
(Oct.
2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Report_on_a_digital_euro~4d7268b458.en.pdf.
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The next month, Panetta announced that the ECB was in a phase of
“listening and experimentation,” and released a public survey to gather
information on European sentiments regarding a CBDC.64 He also stated that
the ECB’s Governing Council will decide “whether to initiate a fully-fledged
project that should lead us to define the specific characteristics of a digital
euro and get ready for a possible launch” by the middle of 2021.65 Thus,
while a digital euro is in its early stages of development, the importance of
privacy has already been acknowledged by Panetta as an “essential element
of modern democracies and part of our European values.” Though Panetta
said that a digital euro would enhance privacy in digital payments because
central banks have “no commercial interests” related to consumer data that
private suppliers of payment services may have, inappropriate usage of
consumer data is just one of the ways in which abuses of privacy can occur.
Perhaps to address this concern, Panetta went on to say that, as payments
must also respect individuals’ privacy rights, the ECB has already “started
exploring possible ways of enhancing privacy.”66 This prioritization of
privacy should be emulated by the U.S. when building its digital dollar, as
discussed in section VI.
To continue this assessment of the international landscape, the Swedish
central bank ran a digital currency pilot from February 2020 to February
2021, and reported that it should not be expected to feature the privacy
inherent in cash usage, due to the fact that CBDCs, whether blockchainbased or not, require some sort of remote ledger, and thus cannot be
genuinely “peer-to-peer, offline, or anonymous like cash.”67 In October
2020, Central Bank of Russia head Elvira Nabiullina went further to say that
a digital ruble would have, “no anonymity in the sense that there is in cash,”
but that “confidentiality will be strengthened.”68
In October 2020, the Bahamas launched the Sand Dollar, the world’s
first fully executed CBDC.69 The Sand Dollar runs on a blockchain, and is a
digital version of the Bahamian dollar, to which it is backed at a 1:1 ratio.70
Unlike the Swedish, Russian and European Central Banks, which aim to
complement cash usage with a CBDC, the goal of the Sand Dollar is to
64. Fabio Panetta, A Digital Euro for the Digital Era, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201012_1~1d14637163.en.html.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Hanna Armelius, Carl Andreas Claussen & Isaiah Hull, On the Possibility of a Cash-Like CBDC,
SVERIGES RISKBANK (Feb. 2021), https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/staffmemo/engelska/2021/on-the-possibility-of-a-cash-like-cbdc.pdf.
68. Leop Jakobson, Digital Ruble Coming as Soon as 2021, MODERN CONSENSUS (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://modernconsensus.com/politics/digital-ruble-coming-as-soon-as-2021/.
69. David Zaslowsky, Bahamas to Launch Central Bank Digital Currency, BAKER MCKENZIE:
BLOCKCHAIN (Sept. 16, 2020), https://blockchain.bakermckenzie.com/2020/09/16/bahamas-to-launchcentral-bank-digital-currency/.
70. Sebastian Sinclair, Central Bank of Bahamas Launches Landmark ‘Sand Dollar’ Digital
Currency, COINDESK (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/central-bank-of-bahamas-launcheslandmark-sand-dollar-digital-currency.
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provide a safe and easy alternative to cash, as well as to foster more
“inclusive access to regulated payments and other financial services.”71
Being marketed and regarded as a true cash replacement in the Bahamas, it
can be inferred that Bahamian citizens have a notable level of trust in their
government.72 However, the scalability of the currency should also be
accounted for, as the population of the U.S. is over 800 times that of the
Bahamas.73
In January 2020, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (“HKMA”) and
the Bank of Thailand announced their findings from Project Inthanon, their
CBDC research project, conducted in partnership with eight commercial
banks and R3, a blockchain company.74 Edmond Lau, the Senior Executive
Director of the HKMA, stated that the project was a first step towards solving
the “pain points of low efficiency and high costs in traditional cross-border
payments…with the use of blockchain technology.”75 The two central banks
developed a prototype using a distributed ledger in collaboration with ten
banks, from both of the nations.76 Ultimately, while both authorities have yet
to release their own CBDCs, they have agreed to proceed in their research
and continue trials, perhaps with more collaborators.77 Later in 2020, Hong
Kong began stricter regulation of cryptocurrencies in order to strengthen
their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist infrastructure.78 In
response, Paul Haswell, a technology expert at international law firm Pinsent
Masons, warned that “cryptocurrencies have existed in something of a grey
area in Hong Kong for some time, with talk of regulation rife for the last five
years…regulation will also likely be against the backdrop of China’s own
state-run digital currency, so Hong Kong will want to ensure any rival digital
currencies are subject to oversight.”79 Thus, tensions between distributed
ledger-based cryptocurrencies and centralized digital currencies are already
beginning to rise, and this same tension should be expected between a future
digital dollar and existing cryptocurrencies in the U.S.
Ten days after the Bahamas launched its CBDC, the National Bank of
Cambodia entered the market with its blockchain-based Bakong system.80
71. About Us, SAND DOLLAR, https://www.sanddollar.bs/about (last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
72. Sand Dollar, https://www.sanddollar.bs/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
73. World Bank Group, Economy Profile of the Bahamas, (last visited Mar. 18, 2021)
https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/b/bahamas/BHS.pdf.
74. Press Release, Bank of Thailand, The Outcomes and Findings of Project Inthanon-LionRock and
the
Next
Steps
(Jan.
22,
2020),
https://www.bot.or.th/English/FinancialMarkets/ProjectInthanon/Pages/Inthanon_LionRock.aspx.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Paul Haswell, Hong Kong to Regulate Cryptocurrency Markets, PINSENT MASONS: OUT-LAW
(Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/news/hong-kong-to-regulate-cryptocurrencymarkets.
79. Id.
80. Paddy Baker, Cambodia Readies a Blockchain-Based Digital Currency, COINDESK (Jan. 20,
2020), https://www.coindesk.com/cambodia-readies-a-blockchain-based-digital-currency.
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The Cambodian central bank will back these transactions with both its fiat
currency, the riel, and the U.S. dollar.81 The Bank of Korea has been running
a CBDC pilot since February 2020, which began its final phase in early
2021.82 Lastly, the ECB, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank
of Japan, the Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank, together with
the BIS, have created a coalition to share experiences as they assess the
potential cases for CBDCs in their home jurisdictions.83
It is clear that there is excitement surrounding the adaptation of CBDCs,
and any uncertainty associated has yet to stall development. The gradual
steps taken by the aforementioned countries indicates a global movement
towards this technology; albeit a deliberate and careful one.

SECTION V: PRIVACY AND LAW IN THE U.S.
The U.S. is the world’s largest economy, encompassing one-fourth of
the world’s wealth.84 Its dominance on the global stage is in large part due to
the dominance of its currency. About 59%85 of all foreign exchange currency
reserves are denominated in U.S. dollars.86 The dollar plays a key role in the
international payments system – it is what gives U.S. sanctions their bite.87
The preeminence of the dollar ultimately ensures financial stability and
security to the American consumer and the broader economy. The status of
a country’s currency, in large part, goes hand-in-hand with that country’s
power in the international arena; the methodical and scrupulous development
of a CBDC will inevitably become a national security imperative.
Accordingly, discussions surrounding the digitization of currency are
of large interest to the U.S. government. Given the unique features of the
American economy, and unique concerns of the American consumer, this
paper advocates the position that regulation of a digital dollar must have
privacy preservation at its forefront.
81. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 35; Press Release, Bloomberg, Soramitsu Develops World’s
First Blockchain-Based Retail Payments System with National Bank of Cambodia (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2020-01-31/soramitsu-develops-world-s-first-blockchainbased-retail-payments-system-with-national-bank-of-cambodia.
82. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 35.
83. Press Release, European Central Bank, Central Bank Group to Assess Potential Cases for Central
Bank
Digital
Currencies
(Jan.
21,
2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200121_1~e99d7946d6.en.html.
84. Gross
Domestic
Product
2020,
WORLD
BANK,
https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
85. The dollar’s share of global reserves has actually decreased to its lowest level since 1995, down
by a 1.5 percentage point over the last quarter. Julia-Ambra Verlaine, Central Banks Retreat From U.S.
Dollar, THE WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/central-banks-retreat-from-u-sdollar-11617720602.
86. Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, U.S. Dollar Share of Global Reserves Dips in Second Quarter,
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-forex-reserves/u-s-dollar-share-ofglobal-reserves-dips-in-second-quarter-idUSKBN26L2I7.
87. Eswar Prasad, Has the Dollar Lost Ground as the Dominant International Currency?, GLOB.
ECON.
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AT
BROOKINGS
(Sept.
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/DollarInGlobalFinance.final_.9.20.pdf.
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Privacy concerns are not distinctly American, per se; however, they
have been persistent objects of inquiry throughout American history. A
discussion about the history of law and privacy in the U.S. almost requires a
reference to Justice Louis Brandeis and his 1890 Harvard Law Review
article, “The Right to Privacy.”88 Almost thirty years later, while sitting on
the Supreme Court, he argued for a constitutional right to privacy in his
Olmstead v. United States dissent, against the backdrop of the technological
advancements of the telephone and wiretapping.89 In this digital age, new
technologies, such as social media and public databases, continue to call for
increased privacy protection, with regulators in recent years looking to
broaden the types of data that should be protected.
The U.S. takes a different approach to privacy regulation than other
jurisdictions by focusing on specific industries. For example, the European
Union (“EU”) defined personal data in order to regulate it directly under its
1996 Data Protection Directive,90 and continues to regulate data protection
and privacy via its 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.91 In contrast,
industry-specific laws, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the GrammLeach-Bliley Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, have characterized the federal regulatory
landscape in the U.S.92 Thus, privacy regulation occurs largely at the state
level, with some states defining personal data and even the ideas of data
breaches differently than others.93
However, even in the absence of overarching federal laws, states have
created their own privacy regulations. These include the 2018 California
Consumer Privacy Act, which sparked a wave of similar regulations in at
least nine other states, and Virginia’s Consumer Data Protection Act, which
will come into effect on January 1, 2023.94 Thus, a look at the origination of
privacy law in the U.S., and its regulation in the digital age, does indicate
that state legislators are more focused on privacy concerns than is the federal
government.
88. D. Brent Waltz, Senator, Privacy in the Digital Age, IND. UNIV. ROBERT H. MCKINNEY SCH. OF
L., https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/ilr/pdf/vol48p205.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2021), citing Samuel D. Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
89. Justice Brandeis became the first justice to interpret a constitutional right to privacy in the Fourth
Amendment. Leah Burrows, To Be Let Alone: Brandeis Foresaw Privacy Problems, BRANDEIS UNIV.:
BRANDEIS NOW (July 24, 2013), https://www.brandeis.edu/now/2013/july/privacy.html.
90. US
Data
Protection:
Compliance
and
Regulations,
VARONIS,
https://info.varonis.com/hubfs/docs/whitepapers/en/US%20Data%20Protection%20Compliance%20%2
6%20Regulations%20Whitepaper.pdf, (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
91. The History of the General Data Protection Regulation, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR,
https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/legislation/history-general-data-protectionregulation_en (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
92. VARONIS, supra note 90.
93. Ryan Brooks, United States Data Protection Laws: State-Level Approaches to Privacy
Protection, NETWRIX BLOG (Aug. 27, 2019), https://blog.netwrix.com/2019/08/27/data-privacy-laws-bystate-the-u-s-approach-to-privacy-protection.
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If the Fed were to create a CBDC, a greater regulatory framework
would likely come into effect. Moreover, since the regulation of the dollar is
a federal matter, it will be the federal regulatory authorities that will be better
positioned than the states to build privacy preservation into the foundation
of the legal approach to the digital dollar.
In terms of American sentiments regarding privacy, U.S. citizens are
already uneasy about the unprecedented amount of data that both public and
private organizations have been collecting through social media, the internet,
sensor networks, and smart devices.95 This information, dubbed “big data,”
provides these organizations with the opportunity to identify and address
consumer needs more directly and efficiently, but also with the opportunity
to misuse such personal information; for example, through targeted
marketing schemes or, sometimes, fraud.96 A 2015 survey indicated that
privacy is of great concern to Americans, as 93% of respondents expressed
a desire to be in control of who receives certain information about them, and
90% wished to be in control of what information is collected about them.97
A 2019 study conducted by the PEW Research Center revealed that most
Americans believe that they have little control over the data collected about
them by both the public and private sectors.98 When asked whether they
believe their personal information is less secure, more secure or about the
same as it was five years ago, 70% of adults responded that their personal
data is less secure.99
Despite being aware of the privacy threats that new technologies pose,
the utility, instant gratification, and convenience provided by technology
seem to, more often than not, outweigh these concerns. The PEW study
found that only one in five adults reads a company’s privacy policy before
agreeing to it, and only a minority of that population reads it all the way
through before agreeing.100 Moreover, 63% of Americans say that they
understand “very little or nothing at all” about the laws and regulations
currently in place that govern their data privacy.101 This lack of knowledge,
and the lack of any pursuit of this knowledge, indicates that privacy concerns

95. Americans’ Attitudes toward Information Privacy in the World of Big Data, NAT’L SCI. BD.,
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/assets/404/americans-attitudes-toward-informationprivacy-in-the-world-of-big-data.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).
96. Id.
97. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and Surveillance,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 20, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/05/20/americans-attitudesabout-privacy-security-and-surveillance/.
98. Brook Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control
Over
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RSCH.
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(Nov.
15,
2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-andfeeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/.
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100. Id.
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do not prevent individuals from affirmatively sharing their personal data
with third parties.102 This is known as the “privacy paradox.”103
More specifically, there is reason to believe that consumers are more
sensitive about the collection and use of their financial information, as
opposed to, for example, their media usage or consumption habits being
tracked by social media platforms. Thus, the importance of reconciling
privacy with the use of a CBDC cannot be overstated: if a CBDC does not
provide for certain privacy preservations, it is unclear why current private
accountholders would be incentivized to transact with a digital dollar, and
even more unclear why those who exclusively use cash would be so
compelled. A CBDC that fails to prioritize privacy would consequently
undermine a considerable amount of the goals, advantages, and purposes
behind a CBDC.
When it comes to who has access to private information, the
government seems to be preferred over the private sector. The PEW study
found that 79% of Americans are concerned about the use of their data by
private companies, whereas only 64% are concerned with governmental use
of private information.104 This 15-percentage point differential could indicate
that, in the realm of digital assets, a CBDC would be preferred to private
cryptocurrencies.

SECTION VI: THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE DIGITAL DOLLAR
Along with the establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework,
the design of a digital dollar must also be assessed with privacy in mind. The
design of the digital dollar could take two forms: it could be either tokenbased or account based.105
If the digital dollar is token-based, it could use either a distributed
ledger or a centralized ledger.106 A blockchain is a way to implement a
distributed ledger, but not all distributed ledgers necessarily employ
blockchains.107 It is more likely, though, that the government would prefer to
use a centralized ledger, in which a designated central authority is trusted by
all transacting parties to determine and ensure the validity of transactions.108
In contrast, distributed ledgers do not require this third-party role because
they are self-authenticating; they are maintained and validated by several
102. NAT’L SCI. BD., supra note 95.
103. Id.
104. Auxier, supra note 98.
105. Anthony Culligan, Token or Account Based CBDC?, SETL: SETL BLOG (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://setl.io/blog/token-or-account-based-cbdc/.
106. Geoffrey Goodell, Hazem D. Al-Nakib & Paolo Tasca, A Digital Currency Architecture for
Privacy and Owner-Custodianship, UNIV. COLL. LONDON CTR. FOR BLOCKCHAIN TECH.,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2101.05259.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).
107. Rutland, supra note 9.
108. Centralized
Versus
Distributed
Ledgers,
PACKT,
https://subscription.packtpub.com/book/data/9781789804164/1/ch01lvl1sec02/centralized-versusdistributed-ledgers (last visited Mar. 18, 2021).
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separate nodes that store and preserve the blockchain data.109 It should be
noted that distributed does not always mean decentralized. Distributed
ledgers “can be either decentralized, granting equal rights within the protocol
to all participants, or centralized, designating certain users with particular
rights.”110
Alternatively, if the digital dollar uses account-based technology (and,
thus, not token-based), “the central bank would hold accounts for users of
the CBDC, and would handle the debits and credits between users itself.”111
It would thus require the central bank to manage and maintain exponentially
more accounts than it currently does.112 Meanwhile, a token-based system
does “not require reconciling two databases, but is rather the near-immediate
transfer of ownership, very much like handing over banknotes from one
person to another.”113 Thus, there is a clear difference between the degrees
of privacy provided by the two options.
From an architectural standpoint, to ensure the balance of governmental
power with the protection of individual privacy interests, prioritizing the
preservation of identifying information must be at the forefront of the
composition of a digital dollar. As noted by the Bank of Canada in a staff
analytical note applying Dr. Anna Cavoukian’s Privacy by Design concept,
privacy must be “designed into the system from the outset,” as opposed to
“the alternative, of doing a functional design first and adding privacy…later,
[which] carries risks of unnecessary trade-offs.”114 This is due to the
important distinction between privacy and mere data protection. While data
protection “is about preventing unauthorised use of data following its
collection, privacy is about preventing individuals…from revealing
information about their (legitimate) habits and behaviours in the first
instance.”115 A future CBDC regulatory framework should acknowledge that
the two are not interchangeable.
Further, in the same Bank of Canada article, Sriram Darbha and Rakesh
Arora suggested design strategies that, if inherent in a CBDC, could be
utilized to achieve “fine-grained CBDC privacy goals.”116 These design
strategies include zero-knowledge proofs, which can prove claims about data
without revealing them; differential privacy and anonymization, which
109. Tracy Molino, Practical Application of Distributed Ledger Technology: Self-Sovereign Identity
on the Blockchain, JD SUPRA (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/practical-applicationof-distributed-71041/; see also Rutland, supra note 9.
110. Rutland, supra note 9.
111. Bouchaud et al., supra note 5.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Sriram Darbha & Rakesh Arora, Privacy in CBDC Technology, BANK OF CAN. (June 2020),
www.bankofcanada. ca/2020/06/staff-analytical-note-2020-9/; Ann Cavoukian, The 7 Foundational
Principles: Implementation and Mapping of Fair Practices, PRIV. BY DESIGN,
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/pbd_implement_7found_principles.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2021).
115. Goodell et al., supra note 106.
116. Darbha, supra note 114.
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ensure that personally identifiable information cannot be extracted from
sensitive datasets; and secret sharing schemes, which guarantee that sensitive
data is disclosed only when an adequate number of entities (e.g., three of
five) agree.117 Importantly, most of the suggested techniques are flexible
enough to be used across different technology platforms; thus, regardless of
whether the U.S. opts for a centralized or distributed ledger foundation for
its CBDC, these privacy design ideas ought to be considered.118
However, while the technical considerations of privacy are important,
for the purposes of this paper, the regulatory framework surrounding a
CBDC is the main object of inquiry. In this vein, privacy must be the first
consideration that the U.S. government addresses in building the legal
infrastructure that must exist preceding any introduction of a CBDC.

SECTION VII: POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR A PRIVACY-CONSCIOUS
CBDC REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Because the regulatory framework for CBDC regulation must prioritize
privacy, it is useful to consider relevant policy prescriptions throughout the
future legislative process. The two that this paper advocates– destigmatization of digital currency and allowing for anonymity – are a logical
place to start.
A.

DESTIGMATIZING DIGITAL CURRENCY
To return to the current legal framework in place, the governmental
stance towards cryptocurrency and privacy seems to be taking a federalist
approach. First, consider FinCEN’s December 2020 proposed regulation,
which would require cryptocurrency exchanges to collect identity data about
individuals who transact with their customers using self-hosted
cryptocurrency wallets, and turn the information over to the government in
certain circumstances.119 The authors of the bill clarified that its motive is to
protect against threats to national interests posed by these technologies.120
The regulation is likely to further distinguish the use of cryptocurrency from
the use of cash. Some cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, operate such that,
when one knows the name of a user associated with a Bitcoin address, they
may glean information about all their transactions associated with that
address.121 Thus, it appears that the government is attempting to collect larger
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Requirements for Certain Transactions Involving Convertible Virtual Currency or Digital
Assets, 85 Fed. Reg. 83840 (proposed Dec. 23, 2020) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020 &
2022).
120. Marta Belcher & Aaron Mackey, The U.S. Government Is Targeting Cryptocurrency to Expand
the Reach of Its Financial Surveillance, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/12/us-government-targeting-cryptocurrency-expand-reach-itsfinancial-surveillance.
121. Id.

168

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18:1

amounts of data. This attempt may be part of an effort to apply pre-existing
regulations and financial surveillance methods intended for the traditional
banking system, to cryptocurrencies, perhaps out of discomfort with the
financial privacy and anonymity that this technology offers.
Alternatively, this regulatory tone may perhaps be strategic, and a result
of the government’s desire to monopolize the public use of a digital currency
with its own CBDC in the future. The current legislation is communicating
a distaste for digital currency that may be preventing American citizens from
attempting to learn about this technology. The idea may be that the
government would prefer the majority of individuals avoid cryptocurrencies,
and that once the government offers its own digital currency, they will be
more willing to use it. There may be an assumption that any stigma created
around cryptocurrency would not apply to a CBDC. However, to the average
American citizen, the two are not as distinct as the government may think.
Comfort with the technology is the only way that individuals will take steps
to not only utilize it, but utilize it responsibly, with their privacy concerns in
mind. In that vein, the Gratkowski decision, and the idea that individuals lack
a reasonable expectation of privacy in information stored on cryptocurrency
blockchains, should be reconsidered in the context of a CBDC.122 A
reasonable expectation of privacy in the transactions of a CBDC account
may be worth the legal recognition; of course, to a reasonable degree.
Regulating currently existing decentralized cryptocurrencies to a lesser
extent, though, may not necessarily set the scene in a more favorable way for
a CBDC; especially as there may be good cause for bolder approaches to
preventing “crypto crime.” Governmental enforcement of the security and
safety that a CBDC would provide may be necessary to encourage public
usage and adaptation of a digital dollar. In that vein, policies that require as
much transparency as possible on behalf of the government and that provide
for open communication between the public and government officials may
be not only useful, but necessary, in the introduction of a CBDC. The public
will inevitably have many questions to be answered, and many concerns to
be assuaged; destigmatizing cryptocurrency, highlighting the plausible
benefits of digital currency, and maintaining transparency should be
hallmarks of the regulatory framework, as these will be integral to adequate
responses to privacy-related questions and concerns.
B.

ALLOWING (SOME) ANONYMITY
When considering anonymity, the government must do away with the
assumption that one would only desire to remain anonymous if they are
conducting illicit transactions. Conversely, anonymity should be seen as an
effective tool for the government to preserve privacy. In the context of a
digital dollar, anonymity is inherently cash-like.

122. Gratkowski, supra note 21.
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Thus, this paper’s second recommendation is an elaboration of an idea
in ConsenSys’s CBDC whitepaper: “to provide high privacy for small
transactions by retail users, similar to cash today, while programming in high
traceability for larger transactions, whether by individuals or
corporations.”123 This would allow for the implementation of standard Know
Your Customer (“KYC”) procedures on those transactions.124 As a
preliminary matter, preserving cash-like features would be an attractive facet
of a CBDC because cash is inherently private and untraceable. While
financial measures to prevent money laundering and combat terrorism
should still be taken into consideration while regulating a CBDC, this does
not necessarily entail stripping digital currency of its ability to replace cash
usage, at least to some degree.
When digital assets are in the possession of private entities, the
government’s ability to track patterns for potential crime is hindered by
several hurdles. The government usually must access information possessed
by third parties, such as banks, in order to determine if a crime is being
committed. In the context of a digital dollar, the government would be in
possession of the data necessary to determine whether financial crimes are
being committed, while still having the ability to preserve the anonymity
cash entails. Though Governor Brainard did mention in her August 2020
announcement that the digital currency currently being explored by the Fed
may be a complement to cash, that does not undermine the importance of a
CBDC at least possessing some cash-like qualities; or the possibility that a
CBDC, in the far future, may one day replace physical currency.125
With a CBDC, the government would likely possess details of the realtime financial dealings of American citizens. It is this paper’s position that
CBDC regulators should consider a plan of action which preserves
anonymity with respect to transaction-tracing. In theory, the government
could regulate one’s transactions without knowing who they are. To create a
digital wallet, or the type of online account that a CBDC would likely
require, this paper assumes that users would need to provide their name,
home address, email address, and other personal details before receiving a
username. What differentiates this process from a private bank is that the
“bankers,” or in this case, the CBDC regulators, would not have such direct
access to this information, and the details of one’s transactions would only
be visible to certain parties under very specific circumstances.
At first glance, this CBDC may seem to directly contradict much of the
appeal of cryptocurrencies and what they are set out to be: completely
anonymous and decentralized methods of payments. However, a proper
construction of the digital dollar and a preservation of anonymity that is sewn
123. Bouchaud et al., supra note 5.
124. Id.
125. Lael Brainard, Governor, The Future of Retail Payments in the United States, BD. OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
(Aug.
6,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20200806a.htm.
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into the fabric of the legal framework surrounding it may allow the digital
dollar to preserve at least some of the inherent characteristics of the
cryptocurrencies that came before it.
One way to achieve this, for example, would be for the government to
assign random usernames compiled of letters, numbers and symbols that in
no way correlate to any given person. In order to transfer money to another
person, the users would have to provide each other with their specific
usernames. The government would thus not see the details of a transaction
and know who transferred money to who; instead, they would only see that
userBxcRy!4* transferred $20 to user4WD9fx8!~$, for example. In that
case, if suspicious activity were to arise, the government could then look at
an individual user’s past transactions, and perhaps, send a message to the
user, assuming technology would allow for communication with an account
without automatically disclosing the identity of the person who holds it.
Then, in theory, the government could achieve its crime prevention goals,
and only revert to accessing individuals’ information and identity once
probable cause has been sufficiently developed. To reference the ConsenSys
suggestion, small transactions by retail users should remain anonymous to
the highest degree possible.126 In line with this, it is the opinion of this paper
that anonymity should only be infringed upon in high-volume or
uncharacteristic transactions in which there is probable cause, or at least
reasonable suspicion, that a crime has occurred. Tracking this information
with usernames instead of real names is a way for regulators to allow lawabiding citizens to maintain anonymity and privacy while transacting freely.
Under this theory, the government would only access identifying
information once suspicious activity surpasses the line of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, which the government already has the
constitutional right to regulate.
Thus, when considering regulation schemes, the preservation of
anonymity must be inextricable from the creation of a digital dollar. A digital
dollar that incorporates anonymity would preserve privacy to a considerable
degree and promote a standard practice in which one’s personal details are
only revealed to the extent necessary to prevent and investigate crime.

CONCLUSION
A digital dollar may revolutionize the financial infrastructure of the
U.S., and allow for significant progress towards a more inclusive, efficient,
and secure monetary system. However, the concept of a CBDC remains
highly theoretical; the technology has far outrun the creation of policy, and
the first decision that must be made is what the U.S. wants most out of a
CBDC. Once there is a clearer vision of what the government’s goals are,
these goals will be able to guide a pragmatic and holistic approach to
introducing a CBDC. Regardless of the type of underlying technology used,
126. Brainard, supra note 5.
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or the degree to which a digital dollar is expected to replace cash, privacy
concerns will still be raised. While the “privacy paradox” may continue to
reign, such that the utility and convenience of a CBDC will outweigh
corresponding privacy concerns for many individuals, the legal
infrastructure built to regulate and support a CBDC must prioritize privacy
in order to prevent the misuse of an entire new class of information that will
be put directly in the government’s hands.127 Destigmatizing digital
currencies and upholding anonymity to a reasonable extent are just two
considerations to be made in navigating future tensions between privacy and
power that are likely to be posed by a digital dollar.

127. NAT’L SCI. BD., supra note 95.
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